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1. INTRODUCTION
The reform of the social security system is cur-
rently at the center of the policy debate in many
countries (see, for example, World Bank (1995)). The
need for reform is typically associated with the real-
ization that the social security system is not finan-
cially sustainable. We say that the social security
system is not sustainable if the current level of so-
cial security benefits cannot be financed given the
current social security tax base and contribution
rates. At the root of these solvency problems is the
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing mechanism. Un-
der a PAYG mechanism, currently employed work-
ers pay for the benefits of the unemployed, elderly,
or disabled. As a result, there is no direct relation-
ship between contributions and benefits for each
specific individual and the solvency of the systems
may be seriously jeopardized by adverse demo-
graphic and economic conditions. Under such ad-
verse conditions, the social security system may be
unable to generate enough revenue into the future
to finance their current commitments. This is also
the situation with the Portuguese social security
system(1).
While the lack of sustainability is widely recog-
nized as an inherent problem of a PAYG system,
the fact that the same PAYG system may cause con-
siderable economic distortions is less appreciated in
the policy debate. In fact, a PAYG social security
system is likely to affect the labor and financial mar-
kets negatively (see, for example, Feldstein (1996),
Gramlich (1996) and Kotlikoff (1997)). Since there is
no direct relationship between social security contri-
butions and social security benefits for each specific
individual, social security contributions are per-
ceived as taxes on labor income. To the extent that
these taxes are borne by producers, they increase
real labor costs and affect labor demand negatively.
If, however, some of the burden of the labor taxes is
borne by workers, then they will reduce disposable
income and private savings. By affecting negatively
both employment and funding for capital forma-
tion, a PAYG social security system is likely to affect
output negatively as well.
The empirical evaluation of the magnitude of the
negative effects of the social security system on eco-
nomic performance is critical from a policy perspec-
tive. In fact, the presence of sizable negative effects
would suggest that the social security system is in-
efficient even if it were sustainable. Accordingly, the
social security would be in need of reform even if
were sustainable. Furthermore, if inefficiency is a
problem, the conventional recipes to deal with
sustainability, increased contributions or decreased
benefits, could cure the problem of sustainability
but only at the cost of increased economic inefficien-
cies. As a corollary, in the presence of sizable ineffi-
ciencies the debate on social security reform would
have to be re-focused from the issue of the
sustainability of the system to the issue of its effi-
ciency effects.
The objective of this paper is to provide an em-
pirical evaluation of the size of the distortionary
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and Gaspar, Lucena, and Pereira (1994), and Gouveia and
Pereira (1997) on the issue of social security reform in Portu-
gal.effects of the social security system in Portugal.
The analysis is based on a vector auto-regressive
(VAR) approach and the associated im-
pulse-response functions. This approach identifies
explicitly the effects of changes in the evolution of
social security spending on unit real labor costs,
the unemployment rate, the savings rate and out-
put. The dynamic multivariate approach follows
from the argument that the analysis of the effects
of the social security system requires the consider-
ation of the dynamic feedback effects between
changes in social security spending and changes in
the remaining variables. Thus, social security
spending is allowed to affect economic perfor-
mance through time and economic performance it-
self is also allowed to affect the evolution of social
security spending. In fact, it can clearly be argued
that a country with higher standards of living can
also afford a more generous social security system
while a country with, for example, higher unem-
ployment necessitates a more generous social se-
curity system. Ultimately, the effects of social se-
curity on the economic performance have to ac-
count for both the initial shocks to social security
spending as well as the subsequent dynamic inter-
actions among the different variables.
2. DATA: SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION
This paper considers the following variables:
output (GDP), the private savings rate, i.e., private
savings as a fraction of GDP (SAV), the unemploy-
ment rate, (UNR), the unit real costs of labor
(UCL), and social security spending as a fraction
of GDP (SSEC). All the variables are used in natu-
ral logarithm form, denoted by the letter L before
their respective name (LGDP, for example).
For the international cross-section regressions
in section 3, the data for all variables is obtained
from the Statistical Annex of the European Econ-
omy (1995). Each variable is averaged over the pe-
riod 1981 to 1990 for each of the fifteen European
Union countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and the UK.
The data for the time series regression covers
the sample period of 1960 to 1991 and, therefore,
contains 32 yearly observations. The data set is ob-
tained from several sources. GDP is obtained as
national spending in 1977 prices from the long-
term national accounting series published in
Cunha, Dias, and Santos (1992). Private saving in
current prices is from the same source, as is the
GDP price deflator used to convert nominal pri-
vate savings into real savings in 1977 prices. The
unemployment rate and the unit costs of labor are
obtained from Statistical Annex to the European
Economy (1995). Finally, social security spending
in nominal terms was obtained from unpublished
sources in the Banco de Portugal and converted
into 1977 prices using the GDP price deflator.
The social security variable represents spending
rather than revenues. While historically in Portugal
the two series have been closely related, in recent
years there has been a growing discrepancy be-
tween the two. The corresponding deficits have
been covered from the general public account bud-
get, i.e., either from general taxation or from public
indebtedness, which are claims on future private
sector income. Accordingly, social security spend-
ing, rather than revenues, best reflects the size of the
social security system and more accurately mea-
sures the source of the burden induced by the social
security system. The social security spending vari-
able includes the general system covering private
sector workers and the system for public sector em-
ployees. It does not include, however, special re-
gimes that apply, for example, to the banking sec-
tor. Finally, the social security spending variable in-
cludes pensions for old age, invalidity, and survi-
vors (about 77 per cent of total spending) and com-
pensation for temporary loss of income due to sick-
ness and unemployment as well as other welfare
benefits (the remaining 23 per cent)(2).
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(2) The use of aggregate spending is justified conceptually by the
scope of the paper and for practical reasons by the need to
keep the VAR estimates at a manageable level. It should be
recognized, however, that the focus on aggregate spending
obscures the fact that the different components of social secu-
rity spending affect economic performance through different
channels and with different intensities. Accordingly, it is
likely that mere changes in the composition of social security
spending, without changes in the overall spending, would af-
fect economic performance. This point should in no way affect
the answer to the general question in the paper. This is be-
cause all major components of social security spending show a
positive trend and our prior is that all increases in social secu-
rity spending are likely to be distortionary. Implicitly, our re-
sults presume that at the margin changes in the size of social
security spending maintain the average composition of spend-
ing observed in the sample period.3. SOME STYLIZED CROSS-SECTIONAL FACTS
The objective of this section is to provide some
international stylized facts on the relationship be-
tween the size of the social security system and the
evolution of the other variables under discussion.
The purpose is to establish contemporaneous cor-
relations not to make statements on causality.
Table 1 reports on the cross sectional regres-
sions of LGDP, LSAV, LUNR, and LUCL on
LSSEC. As is appropriate with cross-sectional re-
gressions including such disparate countries, all
variables are divided by the square root of the
population of the respective country. This elimi-
nates problems of heteroskedasticity on the as-
sumption that the variance of the country-specific
residual is proportional to the population of the
country.
The international cross-section regressions
show a strong positive correlation between na-
tional output and the savings rate and social secu-
rity spending. This suggests that social security is
a normal good good: richer and thriftier countries
tend to have more of it. If one has the prior belief
that social security may reduces savings and low-
ers GDP growth, then this results suggest that
these effects are contemporaneously dominated by
the “normal good” effect. In addition, both the
unit costs of labor and unemployment are also
strongly and positively correlated with the level of
social security spending. This is consistent with
the intuition that countries with higher unemploy-
ment may seek greater unemployment protection
while at the same time greater unemployment pro-
tection may induce higher unemployment.
Table 2 reports on the regressions of LGDP,
LSAV, LUNR, and LUCL on LSSEC with time se-
ries data for Portugal. The pattern of correlations
that we have identified in the cross-sectional re-
gressions for the EU is also found when we con-
sider the same regressions with time series data
for Portugal. In particular, there is a strong posi-
tive correlation between GDP and the unemploy-
ment rate and social security spending.
These results have very important policy impli-
cations and are very useful in putting the richer
VAR results below into perspective. Portugal is
currently going through a deliberate process of
real convergence to EU standards. This means that
GDP in purchasing power parity in Portugal is ex-
pected to increase substantially over the next de-
cade or so. The positive correlation between GDP
and the size of social security system suggests that
there will be great pressures to increase the gener-
osity of the Portuguese social security system. It
also worth noticing, however, that in the
cross-section regressions the observation for Por-
tugal is below the regression line for both GDP
and savings. This suggests that Portugal has a so-
cial security system that is more generous than
what is implied, by EU standards, by its level of
GDP per capita and savings performance. Thus,
there may be less pressure to upgrade the social
security system than what would be implied by an
improvement in the Portuguese standards of liv-
ing.
At the same time Portugal is currently experi-
encing levels of unemployment that are relatively




Dependent variable: LPIB LPOUP LTXDES LCTUP
Constant 2.503 0.974 0.085 2.589
(0.324) (0.194) (0.259) (0.180)
LSSEG 0.610 0.827 0.458 0.638
(0261) (0.156) (0.208) (0.145)
R
2
0.22 0.63 0.19 0.53
Note: standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2
TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS
Dependent variable: LGDP LSAV LUNR LUCL
Constant 13.644 -0.146 3.843 6.613
(0.276) (0.834) (0.363) (0.176)
Trend 0.025 -0.004 -0.003 -0.030
(0.004) (0.013) (0.021) (0.003)
LSSEG 0.323 0.559 0.884 0.593
(0.078) (0.235) (0.384) (0.050)
R
2 0.97 0.58 0.60 0.82
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Table 3
TESTING THE NULL HYPOTHESIS OF A UNIT ROOT
Variable Deterministic components Optimal lag Test Statistic Value Critical
(BIC) 5% 1%
LGDP Constant 0 -2.7167 -2.93 -3.58
LSAV None 0 -0.6183 -1.95 -2.62
LUNR None 0 0.0066 -1.95 -2.62
LUCL None 2 -0.1598 -1.95 -2.62
LSSEG * None 0 -2.9388 -1.95 -2.62
Note: * cannot reject the null hypothesis with Phillips-Perron’s z-test.
Table 4
TESTING OF COINTEGRATION
Variable Deterministic components Optimal lag Test Statistic Value Critical
(BIC) 5% 1%
LGDP Constant & Trend 0 -3.5169 -4.45 -5.07
LSAV Constant & Trend 0 -3.6065 -4.45 -5.07
LUNR Constant & Trend 0 -3.6419 -4.45 -5.07
LUCL* Constant & Trend 1 -7.4658 -4.45 -5.07
LSSEG * Constant & Trend 1 -5.4574 -4.45 -5.07
Note: * cannot reject the null hypothesis with Phillips-Perron’s z-test.
Table 5
SPECIFICATION FOR THE VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS
Deterministic components Lags AIC BIC
None 1 -25.051 -23.883
Constant 1 -25.206 -24.205
Constant & Trend 1 -25.433 -24.599
None 2 -26.49 -24.232
Constant 2 -26.684 -24.699
Constant & Trend 2 -26.721 -24.709low by EU standards. There is a great concern that
either institutional or economic changes may in-
crease the unemployment rate. The positive corre-
lation between the unemployment rate and the
size of the social security suggests that there will
be pressures to increase the generosity of the sys-
tem, in particular the unemployment benefits. This
is particularly important since in this case the ob-
servation for Portugal in the cross section unem-
ployment regression is well above the regression
line. This suggests that Portugal has currently a
social security system that is less generous than
what is implied, by EU standards, by its unem-
ployment rate.
4. VAR ESTIMATION AND IMPULSE
RESPONSE FUNCTION ANALYSIS
4.1 Preliminary data analysis and VAR estimation
To decide on the order of integration of the
variables we test the null hypothesis of a unit root
on LGDP, LSAV, LUNR, LUCL and LSSEC. The
results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
t-test are reported in Table 3. The optimal lag
structure was chosen using the Box Information
Criterion (BIC). A deterministic component was
considered if statistically significant. In all but one
case, the value of the ADF t-test is greater than the
5 per cent critical value. Therefore, the null hy-
pothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. In the
case of LSSEC, further experiments not reported in
Table 3, suggest that the null hypothesis of a unit
root cannot be rejected using the ADF t-test with
any other specification of the deterministic compo-
nent. Furthermore, the null of a unit root cannot be
rejected, even at the 10 per cent level, with the
Phillips-Perron’s Z-test. We take this as evidence
that stationarity in first differences is a good ap-
proximation for all the time series under consider-
ation.
In order to investigate the existence of
cointegration among the different variables,
LGDP, LSAV, LUNR, LUCL, LSSEC, the ADF
t-test was applied to the residuals from the regres-
sions of each variable on the remaining variables.
The results are shown in Table 4. Again, the opti-
mal lag structure was chosen using the BIC and a
deterministic component was considered if statis-
tically significant. Five cases were considered, the
endogenous variable in the regression being the
residuals of the variable indicated. In three of the
five cases the value of the t-statistic is larger than
the 5 per cent critical value. This means that the
null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals can-
not be rejected and the evidence is against the exis-
tence of co-integration among these variables. In
the two cases where the ADF test allows us to re-
ject the null hypothesis, further investigation sug-
gests otherwise. In fact, the ADF Z-test suggests
that the null could not be rejected in these cases,
even at the 10 per cent level. All together, we con-
clude that the evidence is overwhelmingly against
co-integration.
Following the standard procedure in the litera-
ture, and given the non-stationarity of the vari-
ables and the absence of co-integration, the VAR
estimates are in first differences of log-levels, i.e.,
in growth rates, denoted by the letter D before
their respective name (DLGDP, for example). The
general specification of the VAR model is pro-
vided in Table 5. A second order specification with
both constant and trend is suggested by the BIC.
Likelihood ratio tests on both the second-order co-
efficients and the deterministic components con-
firm this choice. The VAR estimates are reported
in Table 6. In all cases the R-squares as well as the
Durbin-Watson statistics are within acceptable
bounds. The matrix of contemporaneous correla-
tions among the estimated residuals is given in Ta-
ble 7. In general, the innovations tend to display
relatively low contemporaneous correlations, i.e.,
under 0.50.
4.2 Impulse response function analysis:
orthogonalization strategies
The analysis of the effects of changes in social
security spending is based on the impulse re-
sponse functions associated with the estimated
VAR system. These functions are designed to
identify the effects of an unanticipated one per-
centage point temporary increase in the growth in
one variable in the system on the growth of the
other variables in the system. We expect a tempo-
rary shock in the growth rate of one variable to
have only a temporary effect on the growth of the
other variables. It will have, however, a perma-
nent effect on the levels of the other variables.
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sponse analysis depend on the ordering of the
variables. Since the matrix of contemporaneous
correlations among the estimated residuals is not
diagonal, orthogonalization is necessary before we
can conduct a meaningful analysis. Orthogonali-
zation, however, is not unique. We confine our
discussion of orthogonalization strategies to the
use of triangular matrices under the Choleski de-
composition method. In our case, there are five
scenarios depending on whether social security
spending growth is ranked first, second, third,
fourth, or fifth. These five scenarios completely de-
termine the range of results in the impulse re-
sponse analysis.
Of the five possible scenarios, one seems to be
the most plausible a priori. In this central scenario
we focus on the case in which social security
spending growth is ranked first. Here shocks to
social security spending affect the other variables
contemporaneously, but shocks from the other
variables have no contemporaneous effect on so-
cial security spending growth. The choice of this
case is based on the view that within a one-year
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Table 6
ESTIMATES: THE VECTOR AUTO-REGRESSIVE MODEL
DLGDP DLSAV DLUNR DLSSEC DLSSEG
Constant 0.049 -0.090 0.280 -0.052 0.027
(0.031) (0.141) (0.167) -0.049 (0.080)
Trend -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.000
(.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
DGDP-1 0.521 -0.873 -5.597 -0.068 0.106
(0.240) (1.089) (1.289) (0.377) (0.615)
DLSAV-1 0.055 0.031 -0.101 -0.092 0.025
(0.043) (0.196) (0.232) (0.068) (0.110)
DLUNR-1 0.032 0.202 -0.379 -0.005 -0.128
(0.038) (0.172) (0.204) (0.059) (0.097)
DLUCL-1 -0.108 0.165 2.287 0.446 0.828
(0.131) (0.593) (0.702) (0.206) (0.335)
DLSSEC-1 0.090 -0.272 -0.210 0.075 -0.013
(0.076) (0.346) (0.409) -0.119 (-0.195)
DLGDP-2 -0.207 3.216 1.992 0.933 0.645
(0.268) -1.214 -1.437 (0.421) (0.685)
DLSAV-2 -0.084 -0.183 0.289 0.019 0.204
(0.041) (0.186) (0.220) (0.064) (0.105)
DLUNR-2 -0.033 0.365 0.477 0.060 -0.075
(0.033) (0.151) (0.179) (0.052) (0.085)
DLUCL-2 0.056 0.542 0.815 -0.453 0.646
(0.142) (-0.647) (0.766) (0.224) (0.365)
DLSSEC-2 -0.105 -0.416 -0.223 0.104 -0.274
(0.072) (0.329 (0.390) (0.114) (0.186)
R
2 .29 .12 .58 .42 .39
D-W 2.00 2.14 2.30 2.40 2.31period, changes in social security spending can be
determined independently by the government.
Since our central scenario is based on orthogona-
lizations when social security spending is ranked
first, for each variable there is a single estimated
elasticity with respect to social security spending
regardless of the order of the remaining variables.
4.3 On the estimated impulse response functions
Figures 1.1-1.5 show the impulse responses in
our central scenario to a one-time increase in social
security spending growth of one percentage point
(1.00). Since our social security variable is social
security spending as a fraction of the GDP, this
means that at period one social security spending
growth is one percentage point above GDP
growth. As Figures 1.1-1.5 illustrate, all of the im-
pulse response functions display a very smooth
evolution. Though we carry out the simulations
for twenty periods, in each case convergence is
achieved after a period of five to ten years. In
turn, Figure 2 gives the accumulated impulse re-
sponses to the shock in social security spending.
The accumulated impulse response functions
show the effects of the shock to social security
spending on the levels of the other variables as op-
posed to the growth rates which are displayed in
Figures 1.1-1.5.
It should be pointed out that, as Figure 2
shows, a one percentage point change in social se-
curity spending growth induces a total accumu-
lated change in social security spending growth of
just 0.8 percentage points. The fact that the accu-
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Table 7
ESTIMATES: MATRIX OF CONTEMPORANEOUS CORRELATIONS AMONG THE VAR RESIDUAL
DLGDP DLSAV DLUNR DLUCL DLSSEC
s-error 0.0205 0.0931 0.1102 0.0323 0.0525
DLGDP 1.0000
DLSAV 0.3422 1.0000
DLUNR -0.3165 -0.4624 1.0000
DLUCL -0.2482 -0.2637 0.0743 1.0000
DLSSEC -0.3424 -0.5554 0.0857 0.4838 1.0000
Figure 1.1
IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTION OF DLGDP
WITH RESPECT TO DLSSEG
Figure 1.2
IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTION OF DLSAV
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shock means that social security is not, as often as-
sumed in the literature, an exogenous variable. In
fact, while changes in the evolution of social secu-
rity spending affect the other variables, changes in
the other variables also affect over time the evolu-
tion of social security spending(3).
4.4 Elasticities and marginal products
The results of the impulse response function
analysis are summarized using long-term accumu-
lated elasticities and marginal products. We focus
on the long-term accumulated elasticities of out-
put, savings rate, unemployment rate, and unit
real labor costs, with respect to social security
spending. The long term is defined as the time ho-
rizon over which the growth effects on the other
variables of innovations in the growth rate of so-
cial security spending disappear. In our analysis
this means a time horizon of ten years. The long-
-term elasticity is obtained by allowing all vari-
ables to respond over time to the initial shock to
social security spending growth in the first step. It
measures the long-term accumulative effects of so-
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Figure 1.3
IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTION OF DLUNR
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Figure 1.4
IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTION OF DLUCL
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Figure 1.5
IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTION OF DLSSEC




























TO SHOCKS IN SOCIAL SECURITY SPENDING
(3) The idea that the evolution of social security spending de-
pends on the evolution of the remaining variables in previous
periods should not be confused with the assumption that con-
temporaneously, social security spending is not affected by af-
fected the other variables.cial security spending on the growth of the other
variables at the last step. Since social security
growth itself changes over time, the elasticity fig-
ures are normalized to measure the total accumu-
lated effect on the other variables of an accumu-
lated one percentage point change in the evolution
of social security spending.
In turn, the long-term accumulated marginal
products are computed by multiplying the elastic-
ity figures by the ratio of the private sector vari-
able under consideration to the social security
variable. This ratio is in the original levels of the
variables. Since the variables are not co-integrated,
there is no stable long-term relationship among
them and they should be expected to drift apart
over time. This means that the choice of when to
measure this ratio is not irrelevant. Given the na-
ture of our discussion we have chosen to consider
the average ratio for the last five years of the sam-
ple. This allows us to interpret the marginal prod-
ucts as the long-term effects of policies imple-
mented at the end of the sample, measured under
the conditions observed by the end of the sample
period.
It should be noted that the terms elasticity and
marginal product are used in a way that greatly
departs from the conventional definitions. Here,
the effects on private sector variables resulting
from changes in social security spending include
all dynamic feedbacks among all the variables.
Therefore, the elasticities and the marginal prod-
ucts are total elasticities and marginal products.
They measure both the direct effects of changes in
social security spending on output and the indirect
effects of changes in social security spending on
output through changes in the evolution of the
other variables. This is the concept that is relevant
from a policy standpoint.
5. SOCIAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
5.1 Economic effects of social security: social
security, unemployment and savings
The impulse response function results reported
in Table 8 suggest that an increase in social secu-
rity spending leads to an increase in the unit costs
of labor as well as in the unemployment rate. In-
deed, the long-term accumulated elasticity of the
unit labor costs with respect to changes in the evo-
lution of social security spending is 0.582 while the
elasticity of the unemployment rate is 2.463. These
numbers mean that a one percentage point in-
crease in social security spending, say from 13 per
cent of the GDP to 14 per cent using current fig-
ures, would lead to an increase of 4.06 per cent in
the unit real costs of labor. It would also lead to an
increase in the unemployment rate of 0.758 per-
centage points, say from 7 per cent to 7.758 per
cent, using again recent figures.
Also, the long term accumulated elasticity of
the savings rate with respect to changes in social
security spending is -0.850. This means that a one
percentage point increase in social security spend-
ing, say from 13 per cent of the GDP to 14 per cent,
would reduce the savings rate in the long term by
1.4 percentage points, say from 21.9 per cent of the
GDP to 20.5 per cent again using current figures.
Since both variables are expressed in percentage of
the GDP, this result also suggests that $1 in social
security spending crowds out $1.40 in savings in
the long term. To understand why the result is
greater than $1 it may be noted that there are indi-
rect negative effects on savings in terms of lost
wages through increased long-term unemploy-
ment induced by increases in social security
spending. This is above and beyond any direct
crowding out effects among the employed popula-
tion.
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Table 8
LONG-TERM ACCUMULATED EFFECTS OF
CHANGES IN SOCIAL SECURITY SPENDING
Variable Elasticities Marginal products
GDP -0.298 -$3.32 per $l in social security
SAV -0.850 -$1.40 per $1 in social security
UNR 2.463 0.758 percentage points per 1% in
SSEC
UCL 0.528 4.06% per 1% in SSEC5.2 Economic effects of social security: social
security and GDP
The analysis of the effects on output of changes
in the evolution of social security spending are to a
large extent implied by their effects on savings
and unemployment. The crowding out of private
savings by social security implies a lower avail-
ability of funds for investment purposes while the
increase in unemployment reduces the working la-
bor force. Accordingly, one would expect the ef-
fects on the GDP to be negative. In fact, as re-
ported in Table 8, the long-term elasticity of GDP
with respect to the changes in the evolution of so-
cial security spending is -0.298. This means that a
$1 increase in the social security spending from its
current level of 13 per cent of the GDP, would de-
crease GDP in the long term by an accumulated to-
tal of $3.3.
5.3 Variance decomposition: how much does social
security explain?
The results of the forecast variance decomposi-
tion are reported in Table 9. These figures tell us
how much of the variability of each variable is ex-
plained by shocks in the social security variable at
all horizons. We find that the variability of social
security spending is explained mostly by its own
shocks. In addition, approximately one-fourth of
the variability of both the savings rate and the unit
costs of labor are consistently explained by shocks
in social security spending. Finally, shocks ex-
plain approximately 10 per cent of the variability
of output and the unemployment rate. The case of
the unemployment rate is particularly interesting
since it takes approximately 5 years for the effects
of shocks in social security spending to have a no-
ticeable effect on the unemployment rate.
5.4 On the robustness and plausibility of the
results
Clearly, the results above are conditional on the
assumption that the evolution of social security
spending is not affected contemporaneously by
the other variables. To establish the robustness of
the results from this central case, we computed the
values of the impulse response functions under all
of the alternative orthogonalization strategies.
Specifically, there are a total of five factorial (one
hundred and twenty) possible orthogonalizations
for our five-variable VAR system. The range of re-
sults across all possible orthogonalizations estab-
lishes that the qualitative nature of the results
above is very robust. Although, the results pre-
sented above tend to be close to the upper bounds
of the range of variation, in no case is the sign of
the long-term effects reversed(4).
The quantitative results presented above are
also very plausible by international standards.
Clearly, many other countries have social security
systems that are similar to the Portuguese in that
they are based on a PAYG financing mechanism.
In Pereira (1998) the basic methodology presented
in the present paper is applied to European Union
countries and to the United States. The results for
Portugal are well within the range of variation the
for the different countries in this study(5).
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Table 9
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION: PERCENTAGE OF
THE CHANGES IN THE VARIABLES DUE TO
CHANGES IN SOCIAL SECURITY
Variable t=0 t=5 t=10 t=20
DLGDP 11.7 11.6 11.8 11.8
DLSAV 30.8 25.5 25.1 25.1
DLUNR 0.7 10.5 10.5 10.5
DLUCL 23.4 24.2 23.5 23.1
DLSSEC 100.0 50.8 47.1 46.5
(4) The elasticity of output with respect to changes in the evolu-
tion of social security spending, for example, ranges from
-0.330 to -0.144.
(5) The results on the elasticity of output with respect to changes
in the evolution of social security spending, for example,
range from -0.670 in France to -0.012 in the United Kingdom
(Denmark actually displays a positive, albeit small, elasticity).6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper analyzes the effects of the social se-
curity spending on the economic performance in
Portugal. The empirical results are based on VAR
estimates using output, the savings rate, the un-
employment rate, the unit real costs of labor, as
well as social security spending. This approach
follows the conceptual argument that analysis of
the effects of the social security system requires
the consideration of dynamic feedback effects
among the different variables. The main conclu-
sion of this paper is that the social security system
in Portugal is, under the current design, highly in-
efficient. The impulse-response function results in-
dicate that an increase in the size of the social se-
curity system adversely affects the performance of
the Portuguese economy in the long term: it in-
creases both the unit real costs of labor and the un-
employment rate while it decreases the private
savings rate. Since it negatively affects both capital
accumulation and employment the overall effect
on GDP is also negative: a $1 increase in social se-
curity spending decreases GDP by $3.3.
The negative effects of social security have to
be considered in the light of the cross-sectional ev-
idence on the relation between the size of the so-
cial security system and GDP per capita and the un-
employment rate. It has been shown that countries
with higher GDP per capita and with higher unem-
ployment rates tend to have more generous social
security systems. The effort to increase GDP per ca-
pita in Portugal and the spectrum of increased un-
employment in the near future should, by interna-
tional standards, induce a temptation to increase
the size of the social security system. Given the
negative effects of social security on economic per-
formance and the sustainability problems of the
current system, such temptation should be consis-
tently resisted.
The results in this paper are very important
from the standpoint of social security reform. In
fact, our results imply that even if the social secu-
rity system in Portugal were sustainable from a fi-
nancial perspective, and all the evidence suggests
otherwise, it would still be economically ineffi-
cient. It would, therefore, be intrinsically undesir-
able in its current format. This is a far-reaching
conclusion. It suggests that the usual prescriptions
to deal with the problems of the social security
system may eventually alleviate the problem of
sustainability. They will not, however, alleviate
the central problem of inefficiency and may even
make the problem worse. Moreover, it suggests
that the policy debate should be re-focused from
the issue of sustainability to the issue of efficiency.
Changes in the social security system in the direc-
tion of a fully funded system have to be the cor-
nerstone of any meaningful social security reform.
Interestingly, if it true that our results relegate
the issue of sustainability to a secondary role in
terms of social security reform, they also imply that
the sustainability problem in Portugal is substan-
tially worse than previously understood. In fact, all
the estimates of the implicit social security debt or
the equilibrium contribution rates ignore the nega-
tive effects of increasing social security contribu-
tions on the performance of the economy and there-
fore its feed back to the sustainability problem. If in-
creasing the size of the system increases unemploy-
ment and decreases savings and output, it also re-
duces the contribution base. Therefore, the increases
in the tax burden necessary to generate the stream
of additional contributions have been underesti-
mated. As a corollary, the need of trimming down
the social security system in Portugal is even greater
than previously understood.
Given the sensitive nature of the topic under
consideration it is important to conclude with some
words of caution. The results in this paper repre-
sent, unquestionably, an indictment of the current
social security system in Portugal. They make it
more acute the need for a reform of the system.
They also point the need to re-focus the debate of
social security reform from sustainability to effi-
ciency and, in particular, to the need to bring social
security contributions and benefits into actuarial
balance. In no way can it be inferred that the results
in this paper suggest or imply that the social secu-
rity system should be eliminated or even that it
should be privatized. Furthermore, as it is well
known, the transition from a PAYG system to a
fully-funded system is a rather difficult and lengthy
process. As desirable as it may conceptually be, the
change from a PAYG to a fully-funded system can
only be seriously endorsed after a careful consider-
ation of the costs of transition vis-à-vis the future
benefits of having a fully-funded system. This is,
clearly, a matter in which the present paper does
not have anything to say.
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